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1Random Linear Network Coding:
A free cipher?
Luı´sa Lima Muriel Me´dard Joa˜o Barros
Abstract—We consider the level of information security pro-
vided by random linear network coding in network scenarios in
which all nodes comply with the communication protocols yet are
assumed to be potential eavesdroppers (i.e. “nice but curious”).
For this setup, which differs from wiretapping scenarios consid-
ered previously, we develop a natural algebraic security criterion,
and prove several of its key properties. A preliminary analysis
of the impact of network topology on the overall network coding
security, in particular for complete directed acyclic graphs, is
also included.
Index Terms—security, information theory, graph theory, net-
work coding.
I. INTRODUCTION
Under the classical networking paradigm, in which inter-
mediate nodes are only allowed to store and forward packets,
information security is usually viewed as an independent
feature with little or no relation to other communication tasks.
In fact, since intermediate nodes receive exact copies of the
sent packets, data confidentiality is commonly ensured by
cryptographic means at higher layers of the protocol stack.
Breaking with the ruling paradigm, network coding allows
intermediate nodes to mix information from different data
flows [1], [2] and thus provides an intrinsic level of data
security — arguably one of the least well understood benefits
of network coding.
Previous work on this issue has been mostly concerned
with constructing codes capable of spliting the data among
different links, such that reconstruction by a wiretapper is
either very difficult or impossible. In [3], the authors present
a secure linear network code that achieves perfect secrecy
against an attacker with access to a limited number of links.
A similar problem is considered in [4], featuring a random
coding approach in which only the input vector is modi-
fied. [5] introduces a different information-theoretic security
model, in which a system is deemed to be secure if an
eavesdropper is unable to get any decoded or decodable (also
called meaningful) source data. Still focusing on wiretapping
attacks, [6] provides a simple security protocol exploiting the
network topology: an attacker is shown to be unable to get any
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Fig. 1. Canonical Network Coding Example. In this image, intermediate nodes
are represented with squares. With this code, node 4 is a vulnerability for
the network since it can decode all the information sent through it. Note
that the complete opposite happens for node 5, that receives no meaningful
information whatsoever.
meaningful information unless it can access those links that
are necessary for the communication between the legitimate
sender and the receiver, who are assumed to be using network
coding. As a distributed capacity-achieving approach for the
multicast case, randomized network coding [7], [8] has been
shown to extend naturally to packet networks with losses [9]
and Byzantine modifications (both detection and correction
[10], [11], [12], [13]). [14] adds a cost criterion to the secure
network coding problem, providing heuristic solutions for a
coding scheme that minimizes both the network cost and
the probability that the wiretapper is able to retrieve all the
messages of interest.
In this work, we approach network coding security from
a different angle: our focus is not on the threat posed by
external wiretappers but on the more general threat posed
by intermediate nodes. We assume that the network consists
entirely of “nice but curious” nodes, i.e. they comply with
the communication protocols (in that sense, they are well-
behaved) but may try to acquire as much information as
possible from the data that passes through them (in which case,
they are potentially malicious). This notion is highlighted in
the following example.
Example 1: Consider the canonical network coding exam-
ple with 7 nodes, shown in Figure 1. Node 1 sends a flow
to sinks 6 and 7 through intermediate nodes 2, 3, 4 and 5.
From the point of security, we can distinguish between three
types of intermediate nodes in this setting: (1) those that only
get a non-meaningful part of the information, such as node
5; (2) those that obtain all of the information, such as node
4; and (3) those that get partial yet meaningful information,
such as nodes 2 and 3. Although this network code could be
considered secure against single-edge external wiretapping —
i.e. , the wiretapper is not able to retrieve the whole data simply
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2by eavesdropping on a single edge — it is clearly insecure
against internal eavesdropping by an intermediate node.
Motivated by this example, we set out to investigate the
security potential of network coding. Our main contributions
are as follows:
• Problem Formulation: We formulate a secure network
coding problem, in which all intermediate nodes are
viewed as potential eavesdroppers and the goal is to
characterize the intrinsic level of security provided by
random linear network coding.
• Algebraic Security Criterion: Based on the notion that the
number of decodable bits available to each intermediate
node is limited by the degrees of freedom it receives, we
are able to provide a natural secrecy constraint for net-
work coding and to prove some of its most fundamental
properties.
• Security Analysis for Complete Directed Acyclic Graphs:
As a preliminary step towards understanding the interplay
between network topology and security against eaves-
dropping nodes, we present a rigorous characterization
of the achievable level of algebraic security for this class
of complete graphs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, a
formal problem statement is in Section II, followed by a de-
tailed analysis of the algebraic security of Randomized Linear
Network Coding in Section III. In Section IV, this analysis is
carried out specifically for complete directed acyclic graphs.
The paper concludes with Section V.
II. PROBLEM SETUP
We adopt the network model of [2]: we represent the
network as an acyclic directed graph G = (V,E), where
V is the set of nodes and E is the set of edges. Edges
are denoted by round brackets e = (v, v′) ∈ E, in which
v = head(e) and v′ = tail(e). The set of edges that end at a
vertex v ∈ V is denoted by ΓI(v) = {e ∈ E : head(e) = v},
and the in-degree of the vertex is δI(v) = |ΓI(v)|; similarly,
the set of edges originating at a vertex v ∈ V is denoted
by ΓO(v) = {e ∈ E : tail(e) = v}, the out-degree being
represented by δO(v) = |ΓO(v)|.
Discrete random processes X1, ...XK are observable at one
or more source nodes. To simplify the analysis, we shall
consider that each network link is free of delays and that
there are no losses. Moreover, the capacity of each link is
one bit per unit time, and the random processes Xi have a
constant entropy rate of one bit per unit time. Edges with
larger capacities are modelled as parallel edges and sources
of larger entropy rate are modelled as multiple sources at the
same node. We shall consider multicast connections as it is
the most general type of single connection; there are d ≥ 1
receiver nodes. The objective is to transmit all the source
processes to each of the receiver nodes.
In linear network coding, edge e = (v, u) carries the process
Y (e), which is defined below:
Y (e) =
∑
l:Xl generated at v
αl,eX(v, l)+
∑
e′:head(e′)=tail(e)
βe′,eY (e′)
The transfer matrix M describes the relationship between
an input vector x and an output vector z, z = xM ; M =
A(I − F )−1BT , where A and B represent, respectively, the
linear mixings of the input vector and of the output vector, and
have sizes K × |E| and ν × |E|. F is the adjacency matrix
of the directed labelled line graph corresponding to the graph
G. In this paper we shall not consider matrix B, which only
refers to the decoding at the receivers. Thus, we shall mainly
analyse parts of the matrix AG, such that G = (I − F )−1;
ai and ci denote column i of A and AG, respectively. We
define the partial transfer matrix M ′ΓI(v) (also called auxiliary
encoding vector [9]) as the observable matrix at a given node
v, i.e. the observed matrix formed by the symbols received at
a node v. This is equivalent to the fraction of the data that an
intermediate node has access to in a multicast transmission.
Regarding the coding scheme, we consider the random
linear network coding scheme introduced in [7]: and thus
each coefficient of the matrices described above is chosen
independently and uniformly over all elements of a finite field
Fq , q = 2m.
Our goal is to evaluate the intrinsic security of random
linear network coding, in multicast scenarios where all the
intermediate nodes in the network are potentially malicious
eavesdroppers. Specifically our threat model assumes that
intermediate nodes perform the coding operations as outlined
above, and will try to decode as much data as possible.
III. ALGEBRAIC SECURITY OF RANDOM LINEAR
NETWORK CODING
A. Algebraic security
The Shannon criterion for information-theoretic secu-
rity [15] corresponds in general terms to a zero mutual
information between the cypher-text (C) and the original
message (M ), i.e. I(M ;C) = 0. This condition implies that
an attacker must guess ≤ H(M) symbols to be able to
compromise the data. With network coding, on the other hand,
if the attacker is capable of guessing M symbols, K − M
additional observed symbols are required for decoding — by
noting that each received symbol is a linear combination of
the K message symbols from the source, we can see that a
receiver must receive K coded symbols in order to recover one
message symbol. Thus, as will be shown later, restricted rank
sets of individual symbols do not translate into immediately
decodable data with high probability. This notion is illustrated
in Figure 2. In the scheme shown on top, each intermediate
node can recover half of the transmitted symbols, whereas in
the bottom scheme none of the nodes can recover any portion
of the sent data.
Definition 1 (Algebraic Security Criterion): The level of
security provided by random linear network coding is mea-
sured by the number of symbols that an intermediate node v
has to guess in order to decode one of the transmitted symbols.
From a formal point of view,
∆S(v) =
K − (rank(M ′ΓI(v)) + ld
K
,
3Fig. 2. Example of algebraic security. In the upper scheme data is not
protected, whereas in the lower scheme nodes 2 and 3 are unable to recover
any data symbols.
where ld represents the number of partially diagonalizable
lines of the matrix (i.e. the number of message symbols that
can be recovered by Gaussian elimination).
Notice that the previous definition is equivalent to comput-
ing the difference between the global rank of the code and
the local rank in each intermediate node v. Moreover, as more
and more symbols become compromised of security criteria,
the level of security tends to 0, since as we shall show in
this section, with high probability the number of individually
decodable symbols ld goes to zero as the size of the field goes
to infinity.
B. Security Characterization
We are now ready to solve the problem of characterizing
the algebraic security of random linear network coding. The
key to our proofs is to analyze the properties of the partial
transfer matrix at each intermediate node. Recall that there are
two cases in which the intermediate node can gain access to
relevant information: (1) when the partial transfer matrix has
full rank and (2) when the partial transfer matrix has diagonal-
izable parts. Thus, we shall carry out independent analyzes in
terms of rank and in terms of partially diagonalizable matrices.
The following lemmas will be useful.
Lemma 1: In the random linear network coding scheme,
P (∆S > 0) ≤ P (∃v : δI(v) > K).
Proof: See the Appendix.
It follows from this lemma that it is only necessary to consider
the case in which K ≤ δI(v).
Lemma 2: The probability that a linear combination of
independent and uniformly distributed values in Fq yields the
zero result is bounded by
P (Xlin = 0) ≤ 2q + h(q)
q2
,
where h(q) is a function such that O(h(q)) < O(q2). More-
over, P (Xlin = 0) tends to 0 when q →∞.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Lemma 3: The probability of obtaining y zeros in one line
of the ξ × ξ transfer matrix M is bounded by
P (Y = y) ≤
(
ξ
ξ − y
)(
2q + h(q)
q2
)y (
1− 2q + h(q)
q2
)ξ−y
.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Theorem 1: Let P (ld > 0) be the probability of recovering
a strictly positive number of symbols ld at the intermediate
nodes with δI(v) ≤ K − 1 by Gaussian elimination. Then,
P (ld > 0)→ 0 with q →∞ and K →∞.
Proof: Let M ′ be the transpose of the partial transfer
matrix at some vertex v, M ′ = MTΓI(v). We consider the
process of Gaussian elimination of M ′. It is unnecessary
to consider rank K, since in that case the matrix, w.h.p,
is invertible and hence diagonalizable [8]. Thus, M ′ is a
δI(v)×K matrix, δI(v) < K.
We prove the theorem constructively by analysing the
probability of having K − 1 zeros in one or more lines of
M ′. Let p be the probability of having K − 1 zeros in a
line of M ′, and let X be a random variable representing the
recoverable number of symbols when an intermediate node
has δI(v) degrees of freedom. It follows from Lemma 3 that
p =
(
K
K − 1
)(
2q + h(q)
q2
)1(
1− 2q + h(q)
q2
)K−1
.
In the base case with δI(v) = 1, at most X = 1 symbols can
be recovered, since there are not enough degrees of freedom
to perform Gaussian elimination and the only chance for
recovering a symbol is that the line of the matrix M already
has K − 1 zeros. The probability for this is p.
In the case that 1 < δI(v) < K, we can obtain directly a
number L = l of lines with K−1 zeros, and a number δI(v)−l
of lines in the opposite situation. Since we have δI(v) degrees
of freedom to perform Gaussian elimination, we can obtain at
most δI(v) symbols by successive elimination. At each step
the probability of obtaining a line with K−1 zeros is bounded
by p.
By analysing the different possibilities of combinations for
the lines that already have K − 1 zeros and the ones that can
be obtained by Gaussian elimination, we get
P (X = x) ≤
x∑
l=0
(
δI(v)
l
)
pl(1− p)δI(v)−lPl(X = x)
Pl(X = x) ≤
(
δI(v)− l
x− (δI(v)− l)
)
px−δI(v)+l(1−p)2δI(v)−2l−x,
where Pl(X = x) represents P (X = x|L = l).
Approximating the binomial distribution by a normal distri-
bution yields
Pl(X = x) ≈ e
′√
2pi(δI(v)− l)p(1− p)
,
where
e′ = exp
(
−1
2
(x− (δI(v)− l)p)2
(δI(v)− l)p(1− p)
)
Since p→ p∗ < 1, we can state that, when q →∞ and p→ 0
is ≈ exp(x2). When K goes to ∞, so does x, and hence
exp(x2)x→∞ → 0,
and
Pl(X = K − 1)q→∞,K→∞ → 0.
4Since
P (X = K−1) =
K−1∑
l=0
(
δI(v)
l
)
pl(1−p)δI(v)−lPl(X = K−1),
and Pl(X = K − 1) decreases exponentially, and l only
increases linearly,
P (X = K − 1)q→0,K→∞ → 0.
The probability of obtaining X < K − 1 symbols is bounded
by P (X = K−1); it follows that the probability of decoding
X symbols with any δI(v) < K goes to zero as q and K tend
to infinity.
IV. ALGEBRAIC SECURITY OF THE COMPLETE GRAPH
Notice that, in consequence of the property outlined in
Lemma 1, the algebraic security of a graph is topology
dependent. A node with δI(v) ≥ K will not necessarily
receive a full-rank partial transfer matrix. The rank depends
on the available paths between sources and each intermediate
node. More specifically, depending on the topology of the
graph, some nodes may receive only combinations of symbols
derived from matrices with restricted rank, i.e. less than K.
This includes, for example, trees, where a node connected
directly to the source by a link of capacity C can only have
children that receive at most rank C.
As a first step towards general network models, we consider
the case of complete acyclic directed graphs G = (V,E),
n = |V |, which can be generated as follows.
• Generate random labels for the n vertices. These have
some ordering {e1, e2, ..., en} associated to them;
• Make an outgoing (directed) edge from the vertex with
the minimum label to every vertex with a higher label;
• Continue until we reach a vertex where there are no more
possibilities for connections.
This algorithm generates a complete acyclic directed graph
with one source, one sink and |E| = n(n − 1)/2 edges,
since the total degree of each vertex is n − 1 = δI(v) +
δO(v). The source and the sink are naturally determined as
those nodes that have only outgoing edges or only incoming
edges, respectively. The ordering ensures that this algorithm
always generates an acyclic directed graph, conferring the
graphs generated in this way specific properties such as the
distribution of the in and out-degrees. These properties can be
determined directly from the order of the vertex using δO(v) =
n− order(v) and δI(v) = n− δO(v)− 1 = order(v)− 1.
Before proving our next theorem, we introduce the follow-
ing lemmas.
Lemma 4: In complete acyclic directed graphs, a node that
receives R symbols, receives w.h.p. a partial transfer matrix
with rank equal to min(R,K).
Proof: See the Appendix.
Lemma 5: For the complete directed acyclic graph, w.h.p.,
∆S(v) =
K −min(K, order(v))
K
.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Theorem 2: Let φS be the secure max-flow, defined as
the maximum number of symbols that may be secured in
a transmission by using random linear network coding. For
a complete acyclic directed graph with n nodes, the secure
max-flow equals the max-flow min-cut capacity of the network
and is n − 1. Conversely, the minimum numbers of required
symbols for secured transmission is n− 1 symbols.
Proof:
Suppose, by contradiction, that K = n − 1 is the max-
flow min-cut capacity of the complete directed acyclic graph.
The maximum order of an intermediate node v is n− 2, thus
by Lemma 5 we have ∆S(v) = 1/(n− 1). It follows that the
secure max-flow of the complete acyclic directed graph equals
the capacity of the graph.
By contradiction, let the minimum number of required
symbols for secured transmission be ms ≤ n − 2. There
exists an intermediate node v such that order(v) = n − 1,
and consequently, ∆S(v) = 0. Then the minimum number of
required symbols for secure transmission is ms = n− 1.
It follows that the way to secure this class of complete
graphs is to transmit at the max-flow min-cut capacity, if
necessary by adding “dummy” symbols.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Intrigued by the security potential inherent to random linear
network coding, we developed a specific algebraic security
criterion, for which we proved a set of key properties. Perhaps
one of the most striking conclusions of our analysis is that
algebraic security with network coding is very dependent on
the topology of the network. As an example, we focused on
complete acyclic directed graphs, and determined the secure
max-flow, as well as the minimum number of symbols required
for algebraic security. As part of our ongoing work, we are
extending this analysis to other more general network models.
Ultimately, we would like to develop secure communication
protocols capable of exploiting random linear network coding
as an almost free cypher.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1
We will prove this constructively in terms of the ranks of
parts of the transfer matrix. The auxiliary encoding vector in
each intermediate node v is given by
M ′ΓI(v) = (A(I − F )−1)ΓI(v),
where M ′ΓI(v) denotes the columns of the matrix correspond-
ing to the incoming edges of v. The dimension of M ′ΓI(v) is
K × δI(v), with δI(v) < |E|.
To determine the rank of the partial transfer matrix, we note
that the transfer matrix M = A(I −F )−1BT for the network
must be invertible, and hence, rank(M) = K. On the other
hand, to determine the rank of A(I − F )−1 we use the fact
that (I − F )−1 is invertible and thus rank((I − F )−1) = |E|.
We also have
rank(A(I − F )−1) ≤ |E|,
because the dimension of A(I−F )−1) is K×|E|. But, since
rank(A(I − F )−1BT ) = K = min(rank(A(I − F )−1), B)
holds and K < |E| (true because K must be less than the
minimum cut in the network) we conclude that
rank(A(I − F )−1) = K.
We now consider ∆S(v) at some vertex v. For that, we can
consider two distinct cases: the first one is if K < δI(v). In
this case, we cannot assume anything about ∆S(v), since the
rank of the matrix M ′ΓI(v) will be dependent on the topology
of the network. As for the second case, rank(M ′ΓI(v)) < K ⇒
∆S(v) < 0. 
Proof of Lemma 2
Contrary to the sum, the product of independent and
uniformly distributed values in Fq is not independent and
uniformly distributed. In fact, there are two ways to obtain
a zero in a multiplication in Fq: (1) by multiplication between
an element a ∈ Fq and 0, and (2) by multiplication over two
elements a ∈ Fq and b ∈ Fq , such that a 6= 0 and b 6= 0, but
ab = 0. Now, the total number of entries of the multiplicative
table between q elements of Fq is q2, and there are at most 2q
instances of the first case: q instances of ab = 0, a = 0 and
b 6= 0, and q instances of ab = 0, a = 0 and b 6= 0. As for
the second case, it is possible to prove by contradiction that
the number of zeros obtained this way is strictly less than q2:
if this was not the case, all products of elements of Fq would
be zero, and that is absurd. Since this is true for any q, the
number of zeros grows O(h(q)) < O(q2). Thus, we have
P (Xlin = 0) ≤ 2q + h(q)
q2
.
Since for large enough q we have (2+h(q))/q < 1, it follows
that
P (Xlin = 0)q→∞ = 0.

Proof of Lemma 3
Each position of a line of the transfer matrix M is a linear
combination of independently and uniformly chosen values in
Fq , and thus, the probability of obtaining a zero in a position
is given by Lemma 2. The result follows by considering all the
combinations of the possible positions in which the Y zeros
may occur. 
Proof of Lemma 4
Suppose that a given intermediate node receives R = K+θ
symbols, θ ≥ 0. It is clear that the maximum possible rank is
K and thus there is a way to remove θ columns s.t. the rank
of the resulting set will still be at maximum K. Now consider
the case in which vertex v receives at most K symbols. If the
columns are linearly dependent, the condition
{xh1ch1 + xh2ch2 + ...+ xhnchn = (0...0)T },
such that xh1 , xh2 , ..., xhnnot all 0,∈ Fq and h1, h2, ..., hn
represent the columns ∈ ΓI(v), will be satisfied. Since the
linear combination of lines of the transfer matrix is again a
linear combination of independent and uniformly distributed
values in Fq , it follows from Lemma 3 that the probability of
obtaining (0...0)T tends to 0 when q → ∞ and K → ∞,
and thus, the columns h1, h2, ..., hn ∈ ΓI(v) are linearly
independent w.h.p. 
Proof of Lemma 5
It follows from Lemma 4 that w.h.p., the number of symbols
received by a vertex is the rank of the partial transfer matrix
received (and at most K) and thus
∆S(v) =
K −min(K, δI(v))
K
=
K −min(K, order(v)− 1)
K

